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Online discussion threads are important means for individual decision-making and for aggregating
collective judgments, e.g. the ‘wisdom of crowds’. Empirical investigations of the wisdom of crowds
are currently ambivalent about the role played by social information. While some findings suggest
that social information undermines crowd accuracy due to correlated judgment errors, others show
that accuracy improves. We investigate experimentally the accuracy of threads in which participants
make magnitude estimates of varying difficulty while seeing a varying number of previous estimates.
We demonstrate that, for difficult tasks, seeing preceding estimates aids the wisdom of crowds. If,
however, participants only see extreme estimates, wisdom quickly turns into folly. Using a Gaussian
Mixture Model, we assign a persuadability score to each participant and show that persuadability
increases with task difficulty and with the amount of social information provided. In filtered threads,
we see an increasing gap between highly persuadable participants and skeptics.
Introduction
Social information in the form of opinions and judgments
by other people is sampled sequentially. We read the
news, hear rumors, listen to debates on TV, and scroll
through comments on social media platforms and blogs.
These activities inform us and influence our decisions,
but researchers still debate under what conditions these
types of social information improve decisions-making [1–
4], lead us astray [5–9], or simply add to our confu-
sion [10, 11].
Collective estimates of a diverse group of people can
outperform the majority of its members because any ran-
dom confusion at the individual level is likely to average
out and let the most accurate estimate prevail [12–15].
Then again, confusion is not always randomly scattered
around the truth. Systematic biases in individual per-
ceptions may create measurable disruptions in the wis-
dom of crowds [16–18]. Social information may add to
those biases and create cascades, echo chambers, band-
wagoning and herding behavior [19–22]. Partially sam-
pled social information may lead to rich-get-richer dy-
namics [23] and to belief misattributions, which uphold
harmful social practices despite being rejected by a ma-
jority of people [24–28]. Social information may also
have been intentionally filtered or manipulated in vari-
ous ways, for instance through group pressure [29], algo-
rithmic filtering [30], false cues [10, 31, 32], or simply by
plain misinformation [33], often with highly detrimental
consequences for our economy and our health.
Observational data of decision-making processes is
acutely sensitive to the social context in which people find
themselves. Thus, researchers find it difficult to separate
observational data into its social and individual compo-
nents. How may we know how much weight an individual
puts on her own ‘independent’ estimate relative to the
weight put on the estimates by others? Randomized ex-
perimental studies have attempted to solve this problem
by first letting participants make a magnitude estimate
of an object without social information (ex ante), and
subsequently ask them to revise their estimate after hav-
ing received information about other people’s estimates
of that very object (ex post) [3, 4, 6, 34, 35]. This setup
presumes that people change their mind because of the
social information they receive. Other studies, however,
have shown that people routinely change their mind all
by themselves, and that it may be more correct to as-
sume an ‘inner crowd’ in the sense that people sample
randomly from a probability distribution in their own
mind [36–38]. Such a psychological mechanism - and per-
haps others such as hedging strategies due to anticipated
regrets [39], and/or disappointments [40] - make it diffi-
cult to differentiate between ‘inner’ samples and ‘outer’
influences. It is therefore desirable to develop an alter-
native framework that is able to infer the extend of indi-
vidual bias and social influence from a single estimation
task.
We propose to use a probabilistic Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM) as it has properties that are highly valu-
able in crowd aggregation research. First, a GMM asso-
ciates a measure to each data point, describing the influ-
ence of social information on that particular participant
without any prior knowledge about that participant. Sec-
ond, a GMM is comprised of several Gaussians which fit
well to the right-skewed and heavy-tailed distributions
emerging from free response elicitations. Finally, as a
statistical model, a GMM provides confidence bounds to
the estimates, which further adds a measure of model
uncertainty.
We also propose the experimental mechanism of dot-
guessing games [41], where participants guess the num-
ber of dots in an image. While dot estimations have been
used previously in numerosity experiments [42–44] they
have only recently been proposed as useful ‘model organ-
isms’ for crowd aggregation research [41, 45] due to their
advantages in terms of cultural neutrality, resistance to
expertise and/or prior knowledge, and their qualities as
captchas [46]. In addition, dot estimation tasks are easy
to implement and easy to understand. Most importantly,
they have an objective solution and are tunable, allowing
for nearly-continuous difficulty levels and performance
measures.
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FIG. 1: Thread accuracy. Relationship between median log-ratio ydv and log(d) with 95% confidence bounds (shaded areas)
in pristine, historical threads (left) and manipulated threads (right). Colors represent the number of visible estimates, v.
There is a clear relation between d and v showing that social information plays a dual role in difficult tasks: When v is
large, pristine and unmanipulated social information (left) counteracts underestimation bias and improves thread accuracy.
When the social information is manipulated (right), however, a strong overestimation bias emerges for large v. The red lines,
corresponding to the control groups with v = 0, are identical in both plots.
We collected a total of 11,748 estimates from 6,196
unique participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 5,990
estimates were collected from participants placed in 12
different threads where they successively estimated the
number of dots, d ∈ {55, 148, 403, 1097}, in an image,
while seeing the v ∈ {1, 3, 9} preceding estimates (his-
torical threads). Another 3,934 estimates were collected
from participants who were placed in 12 other threads
and shown the same images while seeing the v ∈ {1, 3, 9}
highest estimates made so far (manipulated threads). Fi-
nally, 1.824 estimates were collected from participants
who were shown the same images, but with v = 0, corre-
sponding to control conditions for each d containing no
social information.
We interpret the number of dots, d, as the task diffi-
culty, while the number of visible previous estimates, v,
is interpreted as the degree of social information. Par-
ticipants were placed randomly in one of the 28 threads
(2 × 3 × 4 + 4 controls) and made their estimate one
after another. In order to keep the estimates in a some-
what realistic range, participants could not submit num-
bers below 10 and above 1.000.000. No participant who
had seen a certain image would be able to participate
in another thread containing the same image again. In
addition to a participation fee and a variable waiting fee,
all participants in all threads received a bonus of $1 if
their estimate was within 10% of the true value. See the
Methods section and the Supplementary Information for
additional information about the experimental design.
Free response elecitation of absolute values is known to
create right-skewed distributions with long tails, which
inflate the means. While it is still debated which mea-
sure is best suited to aggregate such data [18], we follow
the lead of Galton [12] and focus on the median as it is
easy to interpret, robust against outliers, and best ex-
presses the opinion of the crowd in the sense that the
majority deems every other estimate as too high or too
low. For the statistical analysis of thread aggregates,
we therefore compare the log-ratio of thread medians,
ydv = log(M(d,v)/d), using a linear normal model to
quantify differences between threads in terms of log(d)
and v, the latter as a categorical variable. The effects
of social information on individual descision-making are
analysed using a GMM on the log-ratio of individual es-
timates Yi with the weighted geometric mean of the so-
cial information as the explanatory variable. The model
assigns a persuadability score, βw, to each participant,
which is high when people are highly influenced by the
social information they can see, and small when people
are not influenced, or when they are skeptical about the
information (see Methods for details).
Results
In accordance with previous findings, participants do well
in tasks without social information, especially when esti-
mating small numbers. For higher difficulties estimates
vary widely and biases become substantial [16, 18, 43, 44,
47]. The median tends to underestimate the true value
and the mean tends to overestimate the true value.
Analysis of thread performance
The relationship between the observed median log-ratio
ydv and the number of dots d are found suitable, accord-
ing to quantile-quantile plots (see Supplementary Infor-
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FIG. 2: GMM results: The left hand side shows three plots of a historical thread with d = 1097 and v = 1, and the right
hand side shows three plots of a manipulated thread with d = 1097 and v = 9. Top plots show the log-ratio estimates over time
(observation no.), with the weighted geometric mean of the social information shown by a dotted line. Bottom left plots show
the log-ratio of the estimates as a function of the log-ratio of the social information, indicating how differently participants
use their social information. Bottom right plots show the cumulative distribution of individual persuadability scores with 95%
intervals derived from the fitted models.
mation), when modeling ydv against log d and v. For
more details, see the Methods section. Historical and
manipulated threads are modelled separately to allow for
differing error variances.
Figure 1 (left) shows that the collective performance
of historical threads declines significantly with increasing
task difficulty d, but improves with the amount of social
information. In contrast to [6–8] and in concert with [2–
4, 48] these findings support the claim that crowds in-
deed may become wise under (pristine) social influence.
It should be noted, however, that the overlapping con-
fidence intervals reveal where thread performances are
comparable. Thus, the negative effects of task difficulty
and the positive effects of social information are only dis-
cernible in situations where people have hard problems
to solve, and at the same time have social information
in abundance. In fact, the median estimate of historical
threads with v = 9 is ‘wise’ in the sense of being statis-
tically indistinguishable from the true value for all d.
In manipulated threads, Fig. 1 (right), the manipula-
tion results in a large positive bias for v = 3, 9 which in-
creases with d, implying that when a task becomes more
demanding, the amount of (filtered) social information
has a highly detrimental impact on thread performance.
For v = 1 there is still a small negative trend, implying
that the manipulation is not very effective. This res-
onates well with the findings in [4] which shows that pro-
viding a moderate amount of incorrect information may
counterbalance underestimation bias and improve collec-
tive performance.
Analysis of Persuadability
In Fig. 2 two exemplary threads show how the GMM
model framework reveals interesting features of the data.
Each thread is represented by three figures. The top fig-
ures show the log-ratio of estimates as the thread evolves
over time with the weighted geometric mean of the so-
cial information shown by a dotted line. Each estimate
has an associated color, given by the persuadability score
βw, which measures the influence of social information on
each participant. A high value (βw > 0.6) in dark green
and blue colors implies a large social influence effect, a
low value (βw ≈ 0) in red implies a small or no effect,
and a medium value (βw ≈ 0.4) in brown and light green
colors suggests a compromise between the two extremes.
The RGB color scale (right) is the same for all threads
and plots. The bottom left plots show the log-ratio of
the estimates as a function of the log-ratio of the social
information, indicating how differently people use their
social information: The more they align with the identity
line, the more they tend to follow the social information.
The bottom right plots show the cumulative distribu-
tion of the persuadability scores with 95% confidence in-
tervals derived from the fitted model. They clearly show
how people may be categorized into those ‘sleeping dogs’
or ‘lost causes’ [49] in red that do not take other peo-
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FIG. 3: Thread dynamics: Comparison of typical historical threads (left) and their corresponding manipulated versions
(right). Colors correspond to estimated βw values. The color scale is fixed across threads.
ples estimates into account, the ‘persuadables’ that tend
to follow others, and a large group of green ‘compromis-
ers’, who try to strike a balance between what they see
others have guessed, and what they believe themselves.
Of course, such labels are only proximate. Given a par-
ticipant has a personal estimate much in line with the
social information seen, this participant may be labelled
as a persuadable or as a compromiser, when in fact this is
only partially true. In general, however, the distributions
are remarkable stable across threads, which suggests that
5people indeed may be partitioned into such overlapping
response types.
Thread dynamics
What becomes abundantly clear when examining the re-
sults from the GMMs, is a sharp contrast between how
people act in pristine historical threads, and how people
act in manipulated, filtered threads. This is shown in Fig-
ure 3, where we compare typical historical threads (left)
with their corresponding manipulated treatments (right).
When the task difficulty is low and v = 1, participants
are not significantly influenced, no matter whether they
see the preceding or highest estimate in their thread (top
row in Figure 3). But as soon as the amount of social
information increases (second row), more people tend to
follow – or at least to compromise. This indicates that
there is a bandwagon effect at work [20, 50], making it
more likely for people to follow others, the more people
have done so already.
If we increase the difficulty of the task from d = 55
to d = 148 and keep v constant at v = 3, as shown
in the third row of Figure 3, the dynamics between the
historical thread on the left diverges strongly from the
dynamics of the manipulated thread on the right. While
the majority of participants in the historical thread are
easier to persuade (green colors), people in the manip-
ulated thread become more diverse and slowly start to
split bewteen those, who are highly persuadable (blue)
and those who are not (red). Increasing difficulty even
further to d = 403, and also increasing the amout of so-
cial information to v = 9, as shown in the fourth row of
Figure 3, makes this split in behaviour even more visible.
For d = 1097 and v = 9, as shown in the bottom row,
the difference is very clear: In the historical thread, a
large majority of participants are medium to strongly in-
fluenced, having a persuadability score around 0.5, prob-
ably because most of the social information they see is
regarded as more or less reasonable. However, as can be
seen in the βw-distribution, there is a high uncertainty in
the scores, because we only model the weighted geometric
mean of the nine preceding estimates, while people pre-
sumably are much more diverse in the way they process
these estimates.
Discussion
Returning to the initial question of whether social in-
formation helps crowd wisdom, or whether it does more
harm than good, our answer is both. Social information
in online estimation threads does help when people have
difficult questions to answer and when the information
available to them is pristine and therefore representa-
tive. However, if the social information is filtered and
not representative of the thread population, it becomes
manipulative and may fool a substantial proportion of
people, which, of course, interferes with any aspiration
to harness the powers of collective intelligence.
Moving from the aggregate to the individual level, we
find that people can be assigned a persuadability score by
using a Gaussian Mixture Model. Persuadability gener-
ally increases with task difficulty and with the amount of
social information provided. In the case of strong ma-
nipulation, we may see a split between a minority of
persuadables and a majority of compromisers and skep-
tics. We do not know how much these influencing ef-
fects are transferable to other domains. However, due to
the general nature of dot estimations, we suspect the ef-
fects to be substantial in other settings as well, and also
for other questions – especially for those that are more
emotional, subjective and political in nature. In com-
putational social science and decision-making research,
there is an acute need to further investigate the types
of ‘disturbances’ in online threads and crowds, such as
filters, rankings, likes, and recommendations, as well as
the types of reaction to those disturbances. To the end of
designing future collective intelligence systems, one needs
to be vigilant about the way social information is gath-
ered and framed. Crowd knowledge and thread wisdom is
fragile, and can only be maintained with strong controls
upon the way it is cultivated and recovered.
Methods
All experiments were coded in otree 2.1 [51]. The code itself is
designed along the same lines as the classical information cas-
cade experiments by Anderson and Holt [19]. A participant
makes an estimate, and the next one receives the information
about the estimate of the previous participant(s).
We obtained a total of 11.748 estimates from 6.196 unique
participants. Any dot-image was only seen once by a par-
ticipant, i.e. we had a total of 3.157 participants seeing only
one image, 1.259 participants seeing two images, 1.047 partic-
ipants seeing three images, and 733 participants seeing all four
images (either in the unmanipulated or manipulated condi-
tions and with v ∈ {0, 1, 3, 9}). After providing informed con-
sent, participants waited in a ‘waiting room’ until the ‘choice
room’ became available. When entering the choice room par-
ticipants could see an image d together with v ∈ {0, 1, 3, 9}
previous estimates. After making an estimate, participants
were thanked and paid a participation fee of $0.10 and bonus
of $1 if their estimate was within 10% of the true number.
The average time used was less than two minutes, see Supple-
mentary Information for screenshot and detailed design de-
scriptions.
Analysis of thread medians
For the observed medians Mdv, d ∈ {55, 148, 403, 1097}, v ∈
{0, 1, 3, 9} the log ratios ydv = log(Mdv/d) were modeled us-
ing a linear normal model. For a given thread, log d was used
as a quantitative variable whereas v was used as a categori-
cal factor. Hence, the model structure for the medians was
µdv = αv + βv log d. Models were fitted separately to histor-
ical and manipulated threads to allow for different variance
estimates σˆ2 between these groups. Goodness of fit was as-
sessed by quantile-quantile (QQ) plots of the residuals (see
Supplementary Information, Figure 6). Although some devi-
ation is present, with the available number of observations we
do not discard the models based on these plots. The low num-
ber of observations also implies wide confidence bands, hence
conclusions from the models can be viewed as conservative.
6GMM model for social influence
A Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) was used to cope with
the heavy tails and skewness present in the data. The GMM
employs a fixed number of states to fit a weighted sum of
Gaussian distributions to each observation, hence the mixture
labeling.
Let Xi = {1, . . . , k} denote the state variable and Yi the
observation for participant i = 1, . . . , n. Then, conditional on
Xi = j, j = 1, . . . , k, Yi follows a normal distribution
Yi|(Xi = j) ∼ N (µj , σ2j ), j = 1, . . . , k,
hence the unconditional distribution of Yi is obtained by in-
tegrating (i.e. summing since Xi is discrete) over Xi
P (Yi) =
k∑
j=1
P (Xi = j)P (Yi|Xi = j).
Including social information as an observed variable in the
model, Yi depends on both Xi and Si, if v > 0. Furthermore,
if v > 0, then Yi influences Si+1 as the next participant Yi+1
will see the estimate of Yi (assuming the history provided
is the previous views). A graphical presentation of model
dependencies (with preceding views available) are shown in
Figure 4.
Xi
Yi
Si Si+1
FIG. 4: Gaussian Mixture Model dependencies with the ob-
served estimate Yi by participant i, the latent state variable
Xi, and the social information Si when consisting of preced-
ing estimates. Dashed lines are connections that depend on
the number of views v. When v = 0, Si is omitted from the
model, when v = 1 then Si → Yi and Yi → Si+1. For v > 1
then Si → Si+1 is added.
Thus, given k independent states and using δij = P (Xi =
j), then Yi is normally distributed with parameters
µwi =
∑k
j=1 δijµj
(σwi )
2 =
∑k
j=1 (δijσj)
2 i = 1, . . . , n (1)
where the mean µj is modeled with social information si as
µj = αj + βjsi, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , k. (2)
Note that µwi and σ
w
i refer to the weighted estimates, unique
to each observation yi, i = 1, . . . , n. This implies, that the
effect of social information becomes a weighted sum of βj
estimates
βwi =
k∑
j=1
δijβj , i = 1, . . . , n. (3)
Similarly for the αwi parameter, modeling the accompanying
intercept.
It should be emphasized that the weighted αwi , β
w
i are
unique for each observation due to the weights δij , contrary
to a standard regression model where all observations are as-
sumed to adhere to the same effects. For the GMM this can be
interpreted as each participant is modeled as a weighted av-
erage of k strategies. Hence, the personal strategy is unique,
due to δij , but weighted among k general dimensions.
For each model, the number of states were set to k =
2, 3, 4, 5 and the model with the lowest Bayesian Information
Criteria (BIC) was chosen as the preferable one. The BIC was
used rather than the more usual Akaikes Information Crite-
ria (AIC), since the BIC penalized the number of parameters
more heavily. The aim was to settle with a decent model fit,
with fewer parameters to avoid overfitting. In our case AIC:
6k − 2 ln(L) and BIC: 3k ln(n) − 2 ln(L), where L refers to
the likelihood value. Note that both criteria are scaled with
3k parameters for k states. The BIC penalizes the number
of parameters weighted by the (log) number of observations
n, as 3k, corresponding to (δi, µi, σ
2
i ) for each state, whereas
AIC only penalizes by a factor 2. Using objective criteria to
choose a number of states/clusters is often prone to simply in-
crease k continuously [52] and as such the AIC yielded much
larger k values (k  5), practically implying that k = 5 for
all models, due to us capping this parameter at this value.
This effect was not seen for the BIC measure for 2 ≤ k ≤ 5,
further supporting this choice of objective measure.
The goodness of fit for the GMM was assessed by calculat-
ing standardized residuals
εˆi =
yi − µˆwi
(σˆwi )
2
= (yi − αˆwi − βˆwi xi)/(σˆwi )2 (4)
and assessing the empirical distribution of εˆi, i = 1, . . . , n
against a standard N (0, 1) distribution.
After removing the 5% most extreme observations, i.e. esti-
mates below the 2.5% and above the 97.5% thresholds, Fig. 7
in the Supplementary Information shows the QQ-plots of the
fitted models. Fig. 8 in the SI-text shows the estimated βˆw
distributions, with 95% confidence bounds provided by the
models. Fig. 9 in the Supplementary Information shows the
observed threads, colored by the individual βˆw values, and the
available social information. Fig. 10 shows the observed esti-
mates against the available social information, again colored
by their individual βˆw values.
Modeled values
The observations in the model were transformed to achieve
a better fit. The estimates were standardized with the rele-
vant number of dots and then log-transformed. Hence, for an
observed estimate ei on d dots
yi = log(ei/d), i = 1, . . . , n.
The available social information, si, available for participant
i in a given thread was modeled as an aggregated value of
the available previous estimates. If we let zi,{1,...,v} denote
these v, then for the un-manipulated threads zhi,{1,...,v} =
7{ei−1, . . . , ei−v} and for the manipulated threads zmi,{1,...,v} =
{e∗(1), . . . , e∗(v)|e∗j = ej , j < i}, where e∗(1) ≥ e∗(2) ≥ · · · ≥ e∗(v) ≥
e∗(l) denote the (decreasingly) ordered estimates e
∗
j among
e1, . . . , ej , for v < l ≤ j < i. The superscripts h,m refer
to the type of information available, either historical (h) or
manipulated (m). Hence, the historical information are the
preceding v estimates, whereas the manipulated information
are the v largest estimates among all preceding estimates.
Following [4] the aggregation of these estimates was a
weighted geometric mean. However, contrary to [4], the ac-
tual estimates were available to the participants, hence in this
context si becomes a proxy for the available social informa-
tion. Letting zij denote the j’th visible estimate for the i’th
participant in either type of threads, then
si = log
(∏v
j=1 z
wj
ij
d
)
=
v∑
j=1
wj log
(zij
d
)
,
where
∑v
j=1 wj = 1. Thus, the log-transform implies that
the modeled values (log-normalized estimates) are aggregated
as a simple weighted mean. The pair (yi, si), i = 1, . . . , n
were then used in the GMM framework. The weights wj , j =
1, . . . , v were determined from density estimates based on the
control threads of v = 0. Hence, for d dots, a density was esti-
mated from the v = 0 thread and then used as a proxy for how
individuals in a thread with v > 0 would estimate without any
social information. Using this, an individual in a thread with
v > 0 is then assumed to assess the available previous esti-
mates based on this density. This way extreme estimates are
naturally filtered and a participants information is therefore
almost exclusively weighted among sensible estimates. Practi-
cally this implied that estimates within boundaries considered
extreme, were almost equally weighted, however extreme in-
puts, either by deliberate efforts to mislead the thread or oth-
erwise just to be considered nuisances were weighted almost
at 0, yielding a more reasonable aggregated social information
input si. For manipulated threads, or threads with v = 1, the
social information available show these extreme guesses. This
is simply what a participant have seen and will thus be dis-
carded by the parameter estimation, fitting a low βw value
for this participant (assuming that the current participant
submits a realistic estimate and not taking the extreme info
into account). In the case of manipulated threads, due to the
removal of most extreme estimates to filter out deliberate ex-
tremities, the social information available can be higher than
the cutoff limit of the 97.5% quantile. However, as in the
case of v = 1, this will simply be the available information
that a participant can follow or disregard. The model will
thus fit a suitable βw value based on the current participants
use of the info available. The R package depmixS4 [53] was
used to fit the model, using an EM algorithm to maximize
the log-likelihood function of the model.
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9Supplementary Information
Experimental setup
Controlled lab experiments of thread dynamics are rare in the research literature due to the difficulties in keeping a
large number of participants in a queue. We designed our experiment along the same lines as the classical information
cascade laboratory experiments by Anderson and Holt [19]. While this design is not feasible in normal laboratory
conditions, it is well suited for online labor markets and crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk
(Mturk), an online labor markets and crowdsourcing platform that has become a highly valued tool for social scientists
who wish to conduct experimental research on the real time dynamics of large groups. Mturk has repeatedly been
shown to meet or exceed the standards set by data collection methods using other means [1, 2]. The platform
provides an integrated participant compensation system, has a large participant pool, and has been shown to be
reliable, replicable, and significantly more diverse than typical American college samples [3–7].
Our experimental setup on Mturk is simple. After accepting our ‘HIT’ (Mturk acronym for a ‘human intelligence
task’) and providing informed consent, participants are asked to wait in a ‘waiting room’ until the ‘choice room’
becomes available. After entering the choice room, participants are asked to take a look at the image and make an
estimate (see screenshot in Figure 5). Depending on the view condition, participants can see v ∈ {0, 1, 3, 9} preceding
estimates. We chose to present the ‘oldest’ previous estimate on the top of the list and the last estimate made on the
bottom. When dealing with news, or financial data, users typically want to see the most recent activity first (think
tweets, online banking transactions, news updates). With conversations it is different because there is a context to
consider of whatever message came before and after the one you are looking at (think blogs or Facebook comments).
We have chosen to use the conversation thread design (oldest on top) because there is no particular news criteria when
guessing the weight of an ox or estimating the number of dots on a screen. Participants have one minute to think
about the image and make their estimate. This might sound as a severe time constraint, but exploratory trials had
shown that participants in general use less than a minute when performing this task. After submission, participants
are thanked for their participation and the experiment ends. Waiting times are compensated with $0.20 per minute
(maximally 5 minutes), participation fee is $0.10, and a bonus of $1 is paid if an estimate is within 10% of the true
number.
FIG. 5: Screendump of the choice-page in the dot-experiment with d = 403 and v = 9.
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Mturk settings and data quality
When working with Mturk it is important to consider the right settings in order to obtain the best data quality
possible [8]. Fair wage, attrition rates, removal of duplicate participants and informative feedback are some of the
most important issues to address.
Average wage for participants in our experiments was ∼ $12 per hour, which is considered good according to Mturk
guidelines and certainly above the estimated average of $6 per hour when excluding un-submitted and rejected work
[9].
Quitting a study before completing it is prevalent on Mturk, and varies systemically across experimental conditions
[10]. On average 20 participants accepted our HITs within the first minute; after 10 minutes the average acceptance
rate had dropped to 2-3 participants per minute and after an hour to less than one participant per minute. Our
scripts were coded in such a way that participants were automatically assigned to a ‘waiting room’ in which they
were asked to wait for maximally five minutes before entering the choice room. This meant that a lot of participants
waited in vain. Due to such a high attrition rate in the first couple of experiments we changed the script slightly
later on: Now the waiting room could contain a maximum of five participants, and when the waiting room was full,
participants were told to come back and finish the HIT at a later point in time. This reduced the attrition rate to
6.5% on average.
All participants automatically received an image-specific qualification when accepting a HIT. This qualification
ensured that participants could not accept any other HITs that use the same image. Further data inspection showed
that 32 participants somehow managed to accept two HITs with the same image anyway. The reason may be that the
time interval between accepting two HITs with the same image was too short for the qualification to register in the
Mturk interface. All 32 duplicate participants were removed before data analysis. In addition, we set the qualification
that participants should have completed at least 100 HITs and have an accepted HIT rate of 98% or above. This
ensured that we would get only experienced and qualified participants.
Mturk participant attention was expected to be equal to or better than undergraduate participant’s attention [11],
while various forms of dishonesty (practical joking or telling others about the true value offline or on an Mturk
participants web page) was expected to be rare. Our screening of data files before data analyses revealed that a small
fraction of participants submitted ridiculously high estimates across images seen, thereby skewing thread averages
substantially. These estimates were included in the calculations of the geometric mean of the social information.
However, they were given a low weight determined from density estimates based on the control threads with v = 0
(see section Modeled values above).
During our experiments, participants had easy access to our email for questions and possible bug reports. Apart
from some minor difficulties when typing from a mobile device (less than 1%) participants had few comments or
complaints.
Dataset
Anonymized data set of all dots-experiments can be found the the file dots.xlsx. Parameters: task = type of experi-
ment; d = number of dots in image; v = number of visible preceding estimates; session = thread name; hashed turker
= anonymized participant id; decision order = order in which participants enter the queue; hist = list of guesses seen
by participant; guess = estimate by participant
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FIG. 6: Model diagnostic plots for median analysis. Top left: QQ plot for the residuals from the historical thread medians
analysis. Top right: the same residuals plottet against session groups. Bottom left: QQ plot for the residuals from the
manipulated thread medians analysis. Bottom right: the same residuals plottet against session groups.
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FIG. 7: QQ-plots for the 29 unique threads from Amazon Mechanical Turk experiments. With some exceptions, the models fit
fairly well. Some series with very few observations are discarded in the analysis.
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FIG. 8: Distributions of estimated βw’s for each thread. Color scale is fixed across all threads. Red colors indicate skeptics,
blue colors indicate persuadables and green colors indicate compromisers.
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FIG. 9: Individual guesses for each thread, colored by their estimated βw values. Social information available at each timepoint
is shown as dashed black lines. The βw color scale is fixed across all threads. Red colors indicate skeptics, blue colors indicate
persuadables and green colors indicate compromisers.
16
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       55
Views:     1
N obs:     452
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       55
Views:     3
N obs:     383
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       55
Views:     9
N obs:     453
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       148
Views:     1
N obs:     412
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       148
Views:     3
N obs:     441
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       148
Views:     9
N obs:     449
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       403
Views:     1
N obs:     444
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       403
Views:     3
N obs:     431
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       403
Views:     9
N obs:     447
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       1097
Views:     1
N obs:     436
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       1097
Views:     1
N obs:     448
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       1097
Views:     3
N obs:     448
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   history
Dots:       1097
Views:     9
N obs:     438
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       55
Views:     1
N obs:     365
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       55
Views:     3
N obs:     328
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       55
Views:     9
N obs:     399
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       148
Views:     1
N obs:     302
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       148
Views:     3
N obs:     402
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       148
Views:     9
N obs:     390
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       403
Views:     1
N obs:     23
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       403
Views:     1
N obs:     14
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       403
Views:     1
N obs:     59
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       403
Views:     3
N obs:     298
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       403
Views:     9
N obs:     401
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       1097
Views:     1
N obs:     113
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       1097
Views:     1
N obs:     71
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       1097
Views:     3
N obs:     112
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       1097
Views:     3
N obs:     73
−2 0 1 2 3 4 5
−
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
History:   max
Dots:       1097
Views:     9
N obs:     398
−0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
lo
g−
ra
tio
 ( y
i )
Social information ( si )
FIG. 10: Actual estimates by each participant against the given social information. Colored by the estimated βw values.
Color scale is fixed across all threads. Red colors indicate skeptics, blue colors indicate persuadables and green colors indicate
compromisers.
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TABLE I: Data Table of threads: method: type of thread - ‘history’ are pristine threads where participants see the v
preceding estimates and ‘max’ are manipulated threads where participants see the v highest estimates made so far in the
thread; d: number of dots in image; v = number of visible previous estimates; N = thread length; median = median of thread;
mean = mean of thread; SD = standard deviation; CV = coefficient of variation; skew = skewness; kurt = kurtosis; bonus =
percentage of estimates within 10 % of the true value.
method d v thread id N median mean SD CV skew kurt bonus (%)
history 55 0 fscmakcz 464 55 2360.57 42038.6 17.81 21.01 445.08 60.99
history 55 1 hs6bovtz 477 57 1682.13 29381.7 17.47 21.18 453.74 57.02
history 55 3 3cda8qpn 405 56 8320.59 73524.4 8.84 9.59 93.58 66.91
history 55 9 bvpj37io 476 56 1239.85 25435.5 20.51 21.74 470.87 56.09
history 148 0 dwnjf9mb 464 140 1349.14 12891 9.55 12.83 172.18 22.41
history 148 1 ehaxc7lu 435 150 2250.86 27802.5 12.35 15.66 261.32 25.75
history 148 3 ck291lk5 466 147.5 2523.51 38071.3 15.09 20.42 427.38 23.18
history 148 9 2hxe3g0w 473 153 3182.51 38085.7 11.97 13.85 196.79 24.52
history 403 0 hqx0v7t5 473 300 4816.02 49624.9 10.3 14.16 220.03 7.82
history 403 1 9bbkjlye 469 320 2791.59 31667.6 11.34 15.23 248.43 8.1
history 403 3 5du4txa7 455 350 2430 29944.3 12.32 15.25 233.19 11.65
history 403 9 spw8qdcd 470 400 3035.65 36078.8 11.89 15.32 235.27 10.43
history 1097 0 hal5jdl0 423 657 8855.13 76379.1 8.63 11.46 138.21 9.69
history 1097 1 huyygtho 461 750 2924.95 25012.2 8.55 17.91 344.84 9.76
history 1097 1 z0rvh02v 473 650 8091.24 68728.9 8.49 11.74 144.62 8.67
history 1097 3 hhb0if6e 470 812.5 4811.97 53329.9 11.08 15.61 259.91 20.64
history 1097 9 wv4xujg7 460 999 2748 31206.8 11.36 21.24 451.09 13.7
max 55 1 aebicytb 384 57 68.7 35.77 0.52 2.82 8.76 54.17
max 55 3 094p61xp 340 60 101.05 413.25 4.09 18 326.23 43.82
max 55 9 8c80yyxl 418 60 75.03 45.69 0.61 4.72 34.23 51.44
max 148 1 78wuly7l 317 152 271.06 323.75 1.19 3.84 19.06 17.03
max 148 3 u2sxnl2p 418 220 366.6 596 1.63 11.6 179.79 9.57
max 148 9 mf57hnwb 412 210 266.74 168.39 0.63 1.08 0.2 12.38
max 403 1 1r17post 25 400 549 402.64 0.73 1.83 4.14 4
max 403 1 6c4s02ki 16 90 452.5 614.18 1.36 2.26 4.85 0
max 403 1 e8vv9575 64 600 734.38 506.71 0.69 0.48 -1 6.25
max 403 3 ua2230ux 315 600 3215.08 9635.18 3 4.84 22.79 8.25
max 403 9 1xyev3dj 422 887.5 4758.88 25397.5 5.34 17.68 339.78 8.29
max 1097 1 7yqp8bxc 116 800 5463.93 15517.2 2.84 4.21 16.95 8.62
max 1097 1 q5brhgnz 76 1062.5 3310.3 4690.72 1.42 2.13 4.19 5.26
max 1097 3 2x6km84z 117 2500 7593.38 9341.25 1.23 1.29 0.35 13.68
max 1097 3 ud5vo371 78 2950 5167.06 12588.5 2.44 7.43 58.71 3.85
max 1097 9 lh7wb36v 416 3410 13024.2 38664.1 2.97 11.9 183.47 8.17
11.748
